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Abstract 
 
A critical question faced by any sovereign seeking to raise funds in the bond market is 
whether to issue the debt under foreign or local parameters.  This choice determines other 
key characteristics of any bond issue such as which banks, lawyers, and investors will be 
involved.  Most important though, this decision involves a tradeoff between the sovereign 
retaining discretion in managing the issue and relinquishing control of the issue to third 
parties to prevent the sovereign from expropriating wealth from bondholders in the future.   
Based on a sample of 17,349 issuances by 117 sovereigns between 1990 and 2015, we 
investigate this question in the context of the initial pricing of government bonds.  We 
examine the three key factors that bear on this decision; governing law, currency, and 
exchange listing. We find that highly-rated sovereigns, with strong domestic institutions 
that protect investors, almost always issue debt under domestic parameters. In contrast, 
low-rated sovereigns with weak domestic institutions tend to issue debt under foreign 
parameters. These findings suggest that low-quality sovereigns are forced to issue debt 
under foreign parameters to assure investors that the sovereign will not act 
opportunistically to expropriate their wealth once the debt is issued.  Put differently, low-
quality sovereigns that issue debt under domestic parameters face a higher cost of capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 21, 2016 
 
 
                                                
* Duke Business School (Fuqua) and Duke Law School, Mexican Ministry of Finance and Duke Economics 
Department, and Duke Law School, respectively.  Thanks to Lee Buchheit, Lee Epstein, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Anna 
Gelpern, Stephen Nelson, Ugo Panizza, Sebastian Saiegh, Jesse Schreger, Mark Weidemaier and participants at the 
First Annual Sovereign Debt Conference (Debt Con I) and the 2015 Institute of Global Law Program conference for 
comments. Errors are ours. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2679077 
 pg.	2 
1. Introduction 
The threshold question faced by any sovereign seeking to raise funds in the bond market is 
whether to do the issuance under foreign or local parameters.  This choice then determines a 
number of other key characteristics of any bond issue such as which banks, lawyers, and ultimately 
investors will likely be involved.  Most important, the decision involves a tradeoff between the 
sovereign retaining control of the issue by relying on local parameters or relinquishing a certain 
degree of control by issuing under foreign parameters. Based on a sample of 117 sovereigns issuing 
17,349 bonds between 1990 and 2015, we examine three contractual factors that are the key 
determinants of where a particular issuance falls on the local versus foreign continuum: governing 
law, currency and the exchange on which the issue is listed.   
The empirical research on the impact of the choice between local and foreign parameterized 
bonds on a government’s cost of capital is sparse.  There are a handful of studies that have 
examined one or the other of the aforementioned parameters.  However, the studies have generally 
been relatively narrow in scope (focusing, for example, on the Eurozone debt crisis of 2010-2013) 
and have not been focused on the question of the sovereign’s cost of capital (focusing rather on 
price movements during periods of financial distress) (E.g., Choi & Gulati 2016; Chamon, 
Schumacher & Trebesh 2015; Clare & Schmidlin 2014).  In this article, we attempt to take a 
broader view of the question –looking at the full set of salient local and foreign parameters in the 
typical bond and doing so over a quarter century of data for the entire global market. 
 Recent interest in the question of local versus foreign parameters has been largely inspired 
by the restructuring of the debt of Greece in 2012. In March of 2012, Greece conducted one of the 
most brutal sovereign debt restructurings ever, forcing the majority of its creditors to take Net 
Present Value (NPV) haircuts in the range of 60-75%.  Greece was able do this, without going into 
legal default, because it took advantage of the fact that over 90% of its outstanding bonds were 
governed by local Greek law. That fact allowed the Greek legislature to pass a law retroactively 
inserting certain provisions into those debt contracts that were governed by local law.  Specifically, 
the provision (formally a “retrofit collective action clause”) enabled Greece to induce the holders 
of domestic bonds to exchange their holdings for a new issue that reduced the face value of the 
debt and extended its maturity relative to the terms in the original issue.  Given the fact that the 
bonds were written under local law, the creditors were in a weak bargaining position.  They did, 
however, make several demands regarding the terms of the new restructured bonds.  Anticipating 
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that Greece would soon be in financial difficulties again, they demanded that the new bonds be 
governed by English law rather than local Greek law. At the time of the exchange Greece also had 
a small number of creditors who held bonds governed by a variety of foreign laws (English, 
Japanese and Swiss).  The terms of these bonds could not, therefore, be altered by Greek legislative 
fiat. Greece tried to induce the holders of these bonds to voluntarily take the same haircut that it 
offered the holders of local law bonds.  However, those bondholders who refused to participate in 
the exchange, so-called holdouts, were paid in full and on time. (For details see Zettelmeyer, 
Trebesh & Gulati 2013; Chamon, Trebesh & Schumacher 2014).1 
Building on the facts of the Greek restructuring, a number of recent researchers have 
examined whether investors who held bonds governed by foreign law fared better than those who 
held bonds governed by domestic law as the crisis in the Euro area worsened during the 2010-2013 
period. Consequently, these studies examine a small number of sovereigns nearing financial 
distress, over a relatively short period of time and denominated in a single currency (the euro) 
(Chamon, Trebesch & Schumacher 2015; Nordvig 2015; Clare & Schmidlin 2014).  For example, 
Chamon et al. study 100 bonds of 8 sovereigns over the period 2007 to 2014; Clare and Schmidlin 
study a sample of 400 bonds from 2008 through 2012; and Nordvig examines 137 pairs of bonds 
issued by 7 sovereigns from 2009 to 2014.  In contrast, our article examines the contract terms of 
over 17,000 issuances by 117 countries over the period 1990–2015. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold.  First, we examine a much greater number of 
sovereigns and bonds than prior work.  Second, we do so over a significantly larger and broader 
dataset than the prior work.  Third, we focus on when-issued prices as opposed to prices in the 
secondary market.  This is an important distinction since a sovereign’s cost of capital is determined 
by the price when the bonds are issued.  Subsequent prices in the secondary market are irrelevant 
to the sovereign’s cost of capital. 
   
                                                
1 Greece was neither the first sovereign to have taken advantage of its control over local law to significantly reduce 
its financial obligations, nor will it be the last.  In 1998 Russia imposed large haircuts on domestic law bonds in order 
to avoid a full-scale default.  Untouched were its bonds governed by foreign law (Duffie, Pedersen & Singleton 2003; 
Gelpern 2015).  The same occurred with Jamaica in 2000 (Erce & Diaz-Cassou 2010).  And during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the U.S. government used its control over the governing law to engineer a transfer of 
resources from creditors to debtors by legislatively abrogating the gold clauses in all domestic debt contracts (Kroszner 
1998). 
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As illustrated by the Greek episode, having its debt governed by local law gives a sovereign 
debtor leeway in restructuring its debt in times of crisis.  A similarly powerful weapon is having 
the debt denominated in local currency.  As an historical matter, there are a number of instances 
in which governments in financial crisis exploited the fact that their debt was denominated in 
domestic currency and increased their money supply in order to inflate their way out of their debt 
obligations (Reinhart & Rogoff 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff 2011; Gelpern 2015).  
Research on the question of whether a sovereign’s choice to denominate its debt in local 
or foreign currency, however, has largely focused on the fact that until recently many emerging 
market issuers have not been able to borrow in anything but foreign currencies (Eichengreen & 
Hausmann 1999 & Eichengreen, Hausmann & Panizza 2005).   There is some research indicating 
that yields on domestic currency bonds are higher than those denominated in foreign currencies, 
but this research has focused only on the subset of emerging market issuers (Gadanecz, Miyajima 
& Shu 2014).  Further, the impact of local versus foreign governing laws and exchange listings are 
ignored in this literature on currency denomination. 
Finally, a third contract term that gives a sovereign leeway in times of crisis is whether its 
bonds are listed on a local or foreign exchange. Stock exchanges are the primary regulators of the 
sovereign debt market and dictate the periodic disclosures that debtors have to make to investors.  
Leeway from the exchange in terms of what information the sovereign has to disclose and when it 
must be disclosed could help buy the sovereign valuable time during a crisis. As best we are aware, 
however, there is no research examining the pricing impact of foreign versus local listing in the 
sovereign debt markets.  There is, however, a related literature in the corporate area suggesting 
that equity prices of foreign corporations rise when they list their stock in a jurisdiction with 
stronger disclosure and investor protection requirements such as the U.S. (Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz 
2004).  The rationale being that subjecting the firm to the listing and reporting requirements of the 
SEC and U.S. exchanges reduces the ability of management to expropriate wealth from its 
stockholders (Karolyi 2006, Witmer 2006). 
At first blush, one might presume that creditors would always prefer that sovereigns 
denominate their bonds in foreign currencies, have them governed under foreign law and list them 
on a foreign exchange.  After all, having the currency, exchange and governing law all being local 
gives the issuing sovereign a “home field” advantage in any disputes that might arise with its 
investors.  This is particularly true if the sovereign experiences financial difficulties and threatens 
 pg.	5 
to default on its debt obligation.  Conversely, one would expect that sovereigns would prefer to 
retain control over the issue by having their debt denominated in local currency, listed on a local 
exchange and governed by local law. 
Of course investors will price these factors when considering buying a sovereign bond.  
Investors will price protect themselves and discount the price that they are willing to pay for a 
given issue by the expected ex post expropriation by the sovereign.  Thus, in a sense, the sovereign 
pays ex ante for the expected expropriation that it might extract from bondholders after the debt is 
issued.  Since sovereigns pay ex ante for any expected ex post expropriation, they have an incentive 
to minimize these costs.  One way to reduce the apprehension that investors would have is to have 
a third-party control the execution of the terms of a loan agreement.  And perhaps the best way for 
a sovereign to assure investors that the terms of the debt will be honored is for the sovereign to 
write the debt contract in terms of a foreign currency (eliminating the possibility of inflating its 
way out of a financial crisis), list on a foreign exchange (subjecting itself to disclosure, reporting 
and listing standards imposed by a party outside of its control), and have the contract governed by 
foreign law (precluding the sovereign from rewriting the law to alter the provisions of its 
outstanding debt).   
In addition to the three parameters under study, sovereign bonds (particularly those 
governed by foreign laws) contain dozens of additional contract terms (For a description, see Choi, 
Gulati & Posner 2012).  These are secondary factors in that they are less powerful than terms like 
governing law or currency in terms of giving a sovereign the ability to expropriate value from 
creditors (if denominated as local).  Put differently, the secondary terms only come into play when 
the bond is governed by foreign parameters. A small body of scholarship has attempted to analyze 
the pricing impact of a handful of the key secondary contract terms (in particular the Collective 
Action Clause or CAC) (Eichengreen & Mody 2004; Gugiatti & Richards 2004; Bradley & Gulati 
2014). However, for the reasons mentioned above, this scholarship has focused on analyzing only 
bonds issued under foreign parameters; the primary focus being emerging market bonds under 
English or New York law.  Put differently, this scholarship on the pricing of CACs tells us little 
about the pricing impact of the choice to go foreign or stay local.   
As a theoretical matter, although minimizing the risk of expropriation is probably of 
paramount concern for investors in choosing between foreign and local parameterized bonds, there 
are counteractive factors that they must consider when choosing the type of bond in which to 
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invest. If investors perceive that it is highly unlikely that the sovereign will default on its debt 
obligations, they may prefer that the sovereign retain control of the debt in order to give it the 
greatest latitude in dealing with financial difficulties should they arise.  In the next section we 
discuss the tradeoff between discretion versus potential expropriation. 
 
2. Discretion vs. Potential Expropriation 
Investors in sovereign debt always face some risk that the issuer will seek to extract value 
from them. After all, governments have enormous power both in terms of the ways in which they 
can extract value from investors (taxes, currency manipulation, threats of criminal sanctions) and 
in the difficulty that investors will typically have in seeking redress for government misbehavior 
(sovereign immunity rules, biases of local judges, reluctance of foreign governments to allow suits 
against other governments in their jurisdictions).  Governments seeking to attract investors, 
therefore, face the problem of assuring investors that they will not utilize the power they have to 
extract value from those investors. Balancing the tradeoff between discretion (flexibility) and the 
potential for expropriation in writing sovereign debt contracts has long interested researchers (e.g., 
North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage 2002; Jensen 2008).  
Our analysis draws informally on the literature on incomplete contracting (e.g., Tirole 
1999).  An important reason why contracts are often left incomplete is that certain contingencies 
are either not observable or not verifiable in court, making it difficult to contract directly on such 
contingencies (Hart 1995; Maskin 2001).  Our interest is in one particular contingency: the 
prospect of a financial crisis that may lead to default.   Sovereign defaults are extremely costly to 
all involved.  Unemployment and inflation tend to rise, the ability to borrow and trade diminishes 
dramatically, and there tends to be general political instability (Borensztein & Panizza, 2008).  
Thus, both creditors and debtors at the near-default stage have an incentive to avoid default.   The 
problem though is that important decisions need to be made quickly during times of crisis if default 
is to be avoided.  And creditors of a sovereign, because they often tend to be dispersed and large 
in number, are hard to coordinate quickly.   In addition to the obvious problems of coordinating a 
large and dispersed group of investors, additional problems arise when there is a limited pool of 
resources that has to be divided. Subsets of creditors may try to lobby to have their portions of the 
debt stock exempted on the grounds that they are somehow especially important and others may 
threaten to hold out.  Ideally, then, the ex-ante incentives of the creditor group will be to delegate 
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decision making – including decision making regarding how much value, if any, to extract from 
creditors in a near-default scenario – to the debtor’s representative (the expert government 
officials).  The risk though is that those government officials will abuse that discretion to extract 
value from creditors and transfer them to other constituencies (for example, domestic voters who 
might reward such behavior by retaining the government officials). 
The implication of the above is that dispersed creditors have both an incentive to grant 
discretion to domestic officials (the expert decision makers best able to tackle a crisis situation) 
and an incentive to constrain those same officials (because the officials might be tempted to use 
any discretion that they have to transfer value from creditors to local taxpayers/voters).   Within 
that framework, the question facing sovereigns is what combination of foreign and domestic 
parameters minimizes the sovereign’s cost of capital. The point can be made with a simple analogy.  
Consider an employee who is smart, knowledgeable and trustworthy. Granting such an employee 
discretion can be a value-enhancing proposition since she can use that discretion to make even 
better decisions than her superiors.  However, if the employee is some combination of ignorance, 
inexperience and a proclivity for thievery, granting discretion can result in disaster – funds get 
stolen or wasted.  In short, employers would like to grant discretion; but only under those 
conditions where they have reason to expect that that discretion will be made to work for their 
benefit.  The analogy to be made regarding sovereign debt is that creditors will grant discretion 
(that is, lend under local parameters) when they can trust the governments to make good decisions.  
And they will constrain the issuer (by requiring foreign-based parameters), when the sovereign 
cannot be trusted.    
The foregoing is consistent with the literature on “credible commitments,” which suggests 
that there are ways other than formal contracting based on third-party control for a sovereign to 
assure creditors that it will make the kinds of decisions that will ultimately benefit creditors.  For 
example, the sovereign might over time build a strong enough reputation for honoring its 
obligations to debtholders such that the sovereign would not lightly risk losing the relatively low 
borrowing rates that a good reputation allows. Or the sovereign might invest in building strong 
domestic institutions such as an independent judiciary and an independent central bank that might 
constrain it from the temptation to expropriate wealth from private persons (North & Weingast 
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1989; Saiegh 2015).2  In short, if the sovereign has enough internal controls to ensure that 
discretion over local parameters will be used wisely, then investors might not require a higher 
interest rate on bonds based on local parameters.3  To reiterate the point made above, if the 
sovereign is trustworthy due to its internal controls, investors may affirmatively want to give the 
sovereign latitude or flexibility in resolving any problems that might arise regarding repayment of 
the debt. As long as there is a low probability that the sovereign will default, it benefits both issuing 
sovereigns and investors if the debt is written in local terms so that the issuer can exploit its 
expertise in dealing with local conditions.  Allowing the sovereign to retain management of their 
bonds gives the sovereign the ability to respond to a financial crisis with speed –- something that 
would be difficult to do if the sovereign had to negotiate permission from its dispersed bondholders 
every time it needed to make a key policy decision.4  Finally, there are likely to be cost savings for 
both the issuer and investors from doing local issuances (no need for expensive foreign lawyers, 
bankers, auditors and so on). 
Our results are consistent with the foregoing explanation.  We find that it is primarily the 
high-quality sovereigns, as measured by S&P ratings and the World Bank’s legal quality measures 
that issue bonds based on domestic parameters.  Conversely, we find that low-quality sovereigns 
typically issue bonds based on foreign parameters.  Apparently the market is reluctant to buy their 
bonds if they are governed by domestic parameters.  In other words, low-quality sovereigns must 
relinquish control of their debt in order to entice investors to buy their debt.  Finally, we find that 
bonds issued by lower-quality sovereigns that are written under local parameters suffer a 
significant discount (a lower issue price) as compared to bonds written under foreign parameters. 
In short high-quality sovereigns issue debt under domestic parameters because they can.  They do 
not have to relinquish control of their debt to a third party in order to get the issue sold.  In contrast 
                                                
2 The foundational article in this area, North and Weingast (1989), argued that 17th century England was able to become 
a dominant world power because it built strong domestic institutions to constrain the monarch’s tendencies to 
expropriate, that in turn significantly enhanced the sovereign’s ability to borrow.  The claim has been challenged by 
scholars who argue that strong domestic institutions are not as important to sovereign borrowing as North and 
Weingast claimed (Stasavage 2003; Mauro, Sussman & Yafeh 2006).  Empirical testing, however, has proved difficult 
(Saiegh 2015). 
3 On the point that greater credibility in terms of monetary and fiscal policy can lead to increased ability to issue local 
currency sovereign bonds, see Jeanne (2003); Claessens, Klingebiel & Schmukler (2007). 
4 This is sometimes referred to as the balance between flexibility and commitment (Eichengreen & Mody 2004; Mody 
2004).  Lenders, Eichengreen and Mody explain, affirmatively want to give rich (and credible) countries flexibility, 
but want to constrain the weak (and less credible) countries. 
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low-quality firms issue debt based on foreign parameters presumably because they cannot issue 
bonds based on domestic parameters because of investors’ fear of expropriation.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next Section we describe our 
data sources and provide an overview of our sample.  Section 4 reports the results of our analysis 
for the full sample of bonds, examining the impact of the decision to use foreign versus local 
parameters on spreads while controlling for factors such as the economic strength of the issuer and 
the quality of its institutions.  Section 5 narrows the analysis to the subset of issuances where we 
have the same issuer issuing pairs of bonds under local and foreign parameters at roughly the same 
time and with roughly the same maturities. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3. Data Description 
 We draw our data from three sources: Thomson One Banker, Perfect Information, and 
DCM Analytics.   These are the three major sources of data on sovereign bond contracts. From 
these sources, we extracted all of the bonds from the post-World War II period.  The data from 
these sources are almost all from the period after 1985.  For the prior issuances, we collected data 
on the bonds available from the archives housed at the Library of Congress, Guildhall, and the 
Harvard Business School Library. For each of the bonds, we coded our key contract variables 
(Law, Listing and Currency).    
 Our data sources are all private vendors who sell data access to investors. This produces a 
bias in that investors tend to be more interested in contract information from weaker sovereigns; 
where the contract terms might actually be relevant.  Indeed, the strongest sovereign issuers – the 
traditional AAA issuers such as U.S., Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and France – typically do 
not provide prospectuses or offering circulars with anywhere near the amount of detail that their 
weaker brethren produce. 
Figure 1 shows the general evolution of the sovereign bond market in the post-World War 
II period. The data show that the market was essentially nonexistent in the first four decades after 
the war.5  The number of issues increased substantially around 1990, as the Latin American debt 
crisis came to a close.   Figure 1 reports the data by the foreign versus local dichotomy.  The data 
show the number of observations in which all three of the parameters are local or foreign or some 
combination thereof.  In the initial years, the preponderance of issuances were written under 
                                                
5 For greater detail on this evolution, see Flandreau et al. 2011. 
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foreign parameters.  As the market matured and grew in size, the fraction of bonds written under 
all local parameters grew.6 
 
 
 
Table 1 reports the sovereign issuers in our dataset for the period 1945 to 2015.  Column 3 
reports the total number of bonds issued by the sovereigns listed in column 2.  Column 4 reports 
the number of bonds issued under all foreign parameters and column 5 the number of bonds written 
under all local parameters.  The percentages are reported in columns 6 and 7, respectively. 
The data in column 8 were constructed as follows.  We first converted the S&P rating for 
each bond in our sample into a numerical value.  The value ranges from 1 to 18, corresponding to 
the 18 categories used by S&P to rank sovereign debt.  Thus, a value of 18 corresponds to a rating 
of AAA and a value of 1 corresponds to a rating of C.  We then calculate the mean value of all of 
the bonds issued by each sovereign.  This is the number reported in column 8.  The data in column 
9 reverses the procedure and converts the numerical mean into a mean rating for each sovereign. 
                                                
6 We postulate that this growth is attributed to the growth in financial institutions and regulatory bodies instituted by 
small countries over this time period. 
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As indicated in the totals row of Table 1, our sample consists of 117 sovereigns that issued 
17,349 bonds, of which 2,293 (13.2%) contain only foreign parameters and 9,423 (54.3%) contain 
only local parameters. The data are sorted by sovereigns in ascending order of the percentage of 
bonds that contain all foreign parameters.  Note that 17 of the sovereigns in the sample issued no 
bonds with all foreign parameters. The countries in this group, such as the U.S., Luxembourg and 
Singapore are at the wealthy end of the global spectrum.  At the other extreme, 46 (39%) of the 
sovereigns issued 100% of their debt under foreign parameters. Not surprisingly, this group is 
comprised of mostly smaller and poorer countries. 
Our subsequent analysis is based on when-issued (primary) data rather than secondary 
market prices that many of the papers examining the impact of contractual features on pricing have 
examined (e.g., Chamon, Schumacher & Trebesch 2015; Clare & Schmidlin 2014).  We recognize 
that in a host of applications, secondary market data have advantages over primary market data. If 
markets are efficient, the prices of actively traded securities provide an unbiased estimate of a 
security’s intrinsic value.  But the sovereign debt market is relatively illiquid; these bonds trade 
relatively infrequently in the secondary market. Reflecting this illiquidity, most researchers are 
forced to use the bid-ask spread instead of traded prices, even though traded prices are likely to be 
stale and nonsynchronous.  Thus, the question is whether the bid-ask prices in the secondary 
market are better indicators of the price of foreign versus local parameters than the when-issued 
rate. More directly, which is a better measure of a sovereign’s cost of capital: the when-issued rate 
(established through negotiations with informed agents) or the average of the bid and ask rates in 
the aftermarket? We argue that the when-issued rate is the appropriate measure of a sovereign’s 
cost of capital. 
The bid price reflects the highest price that a trader in the market would be willing to sell 
the security in question and the ask price is the lowest price that a trader would be willing to buy 
the security, and in most instances they are not the same trader.  Therefore, the bid-ask rates may 
reflect the opinion of only one or two traders – indeed, the most optimistic and the most pessimistic 
dealers in the market.  Moreover, the bid-ask rates are for a pre-specified amount of a security that 
could be purchased at the ask price or sold at the bid price.  In contrast, the when-issued rate 
reflects the price at which the entire issue is sold to the public.  Indeed, it is plausible that the due 
diligence of informed buyers (institutions) at the time of issuance reflects the most informed 
opinion as to the value of the parameters contained in the security being sold. 
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Even if researchers were able to observe actual traded prices in the secondary market, these 
rates would not be measures of a sovereign’s cost of capital.  A sovereign’s cost of capital is given 
by the rate negotiated at the time of issuance.  Only then can we observe the ex-ante pricing of the 
parameters contained in a particular issue.  Once an issue is “sold to the public,” prices in the 
secondary market are irrelevant to the sovereign’s cost of capital, unless of course it expects to 
issue additional debt in the near future.  To see this more clearly, consider the moral hazard 
problem associated with sovereign debt.  At the time of issuance, market participants would 
evaluate the extent of the moral hazard problem given the security’s parameters.  Now, assume 
that after the security has been issued, the sovereign begins to act opportunistically.  When market 
participants become aware of the sovereign’s malfeasance, the price of the security will fall (rates 
will rise); but this fall in price has no effect on the sovereign’s cost of capital, which was 
established at the time the security was issued in the primary market.  Put differently, the pricing 
of sovereign debt in the secondary market reflects the ex post behavior of the sovereign, which 
again, has no effect on the sovereign’s cost of capital. Finally, the vast majority of sovereign debt 
(for tax reasons) is sold at par, which means that the coupon is probably a good estimate of a 
sovereign’s cost of capital. 
 
4. Analysis – Total Sample 
The data in Table 1 have been divided into three groups, indicated by the double underlines.  
The first group – observations 1-29 – contains those sovereigns that issued 5% or less foreign-
parameter bonds.  The second group – observations 30-69 – issued more than 5% but less than 
95% foreign-based bonds.  And the third group – observations 70–117 – issued more than 95% of 
their bonds under foreign parameters.  Table 2 presents a summary of these data. 
The top half of Table 2 has been divided into 3 groups, representing the three groups 
defined above.  The statistics indicate that S&P ratings are negatively related to the percentage of 
bonds issued under foreign parameters.  The mean rating for the first group (less than 5% foreign 
bonds) is significantly higher than the mean rating for the second group (more than 5% and less 
than 95% foreign bonds).  The first group has a mean rating of A+; the second group has a mean 
rating of BBB+; and the third group has a mean rating of BB.  Based on the numeric scores, the 
difference between the first and second groups yields a t-statistic of 3.53.  The difference between 
the second group and the third is 3.13 with a t-statistic of 3.77. 
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Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis of the total sample on our relevant 
independent variables: ratings, maturity and the choice of local versus foreign parameters. The 
dependent variable is the difference between the when-issued rate and the rate on a U.S. Treasury 
bond with the same maturity We assume that S&P bond ratings reflect the creditworthiness of an 
issuing sovereign.  Thus we would expect a negative relation between bond ratings and spreads.  
Moreover, since high-quality sovereigns generally issue local parameter bonds, we would expect 
a negative relation between the foreign-parameter bonds and spreads, due to the fact that low-
quality sovereigns, for the most part, can only issue debt if they surrender control of the issue to 
investors.   
The results reported in Table 3 show that the coefficients on the ratings variables are 
monotonic and all but one are statistically significant: bonds written by highly-rated sovereigns 
have relatively lower spreads, whereas bonds issued by low-rated sovereigns have relatively high 
spreads.  Also, the results indicate a negative and statistically significant relation between spreads 
and maturity.  Note that the relation is between maturity and spreads.  Thus, while the relation 
between maturity and rates should be positive for a given issuer, there is no reason to expect a 
positive relation between maturity and spreads.   Finally, consistent with the arguments above, the 
coefficients on all four foreign parameters are negative and all but the coefficient on Listing are 
statistically significant when measured independently. Thus, holding quality and maturity 
constant, there is a negative relation between foreign parameter bonds and spreads. We interpret 
these relations as evidence that low-quality sovereigns realize a reduction in the required rate of 
return on their debt if they relinquish their control over the three issuing parameters. Put 
differently, investors require a higher rate (lower price) for bonds issued by low-quality sovereigns 
and written under local parameters.  Note that when all three parameters are included in the 
regression model, only the coefficient on Foreign Law is statistically significant.  We attribute the 
lack of significance of the remaining two parameters to the multicollinearity among our three key 
independent variables. 
In Table 4 we expand the regression model reported in Table 3 by entertaining the six 
independent variables that the World Bank uses to assess the governance quality of the issuing 
sovereigns.  These World Bank measures are among the most widely used measures of legal 
quality and, moreover, are regularly reported by the weaker sovereign issuers in their prospectuses 
and offering circulars.  Commentators have pointed out some serious measurement problems with 
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these and other commonly used measures of governance or legal quality (e.g., Davis 2014; Kurtz 
& Schrank 2009).  However, most relevant for our purposes is the fact that these are among the 
two most commonly reported measures by sovereign borrowers in their prospectuses, suggesting 
that investors care about them. The World Bank states that: 
The six indicators all together are a measure of the quality of the governance in each 
country.  The indicators are based on 31 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions 
of governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide.7 
 
The World Bank describes each of these indicators as: 
 
(i) Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media;  
 
(ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism; 
 
(iii)  Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies;  
 
(iv) Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development;  
 
(v) Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence; 
 
(vi) Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption.  
 
 
The first thing to note in Table 4 is that adding these governance variables reduces the 
significance of a number of the ratings coefficients.  This suggests that the World Bank variables 
contain information that is also reflected in the S&P ratings.8 Note however the coefficients are 
                                                
7 Details on the underlying data sources, the aggregation method, and the interpretation of the indicators, can be found 
in the WGI methodology paper, Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2010).  
8 This is perhaps not surprising, since at least some of the rating agencies have suggested that they incorporate 
information on a sovereign’s governance quality into their ratings. For example, Moody’s upgrade of Georgia’s rating 
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almost all monotonic. The holdout rating is BBB, and the coefficients on all higher rated bonds 
are all positive and all those on all lower rated bonds are negative. The data show that Government 
Effectiveness is the only one of the six World Bank variables discussed earlier that is statistically 
significant.  This result suggests that a high perception of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, decreases the 
interest rate that sovereigns have to pay on the debt it issues. Note also that all of the coefficients 
on foreign parameters are negative and all but foreign Listing are statistically different from zero.  
Note too that none of the foreign parameters are statistically significant when all three are included 
in the model (column 5). 
Finally, in Table 5 we rerun our regressions substituting real interest rate spreads for the 
dependent variable, where real interest rates are defined as:  
Real Rate = (1+Nominal Rate) / (1+Rate of Inflation) -1  
and Real Spreads are calculated as the difference between the Real Rate of the issuing currency 
minus the Real Rate on U.S. Treasury bonds with the same maturity.  Our intent is to determine to 
what extent our results are being driven by expected inflation.  To illustrate our concerns, consider 
the following example: 
Assume two countries with identical institutions, ratings, etc., but one has slightly higher 
rate of inflation than the other (think of the U.S. and Switzerland). Also assume that the 10-year 
interest rate in the U.S. is 5% and that inflation in the U.S. is always 2% and in CHF always 1%. 
Further assume that everybody knows this (so CHF appreciates by 1% per year vis-à-vis USD) 
and that things never change. Then, the Swiss government can either issue in CHF at 4% or USD 
at 5%. Here, it looks as if borrowing in CHF is cheaper (in nominal terms), but the cost is really 
the same in real terms.9  
We use the average annual realized inflation rate over the 5-years before issuance to proxy 
for the expected rate of inflation.  Although the other independent variables change in sign and 
significance, three of our primary variables (Law, Listing and Currency) remain negative and 
significant when estimated separately.  
                                                
in 2014 was reportedly based on Georgia’s improved position on various rule of law measures.  See Moody’s (2014). 
But, as best we have been able to discern, none of the ratings agencies report how precisely they incorporate 
governance measures into their ratings. 
9 Our thanks to Ugo Panizza for this example. 
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As shown in Table 1, the total sample includes sovereigns that either issue all local 
parameter bonds or all foreign parameter bonds exclusively.  Since these sovereigns have 
significantly different financial, governance and regulatory conditions, they may well contaminate 
the data.  Put differently, there may be too many differences in these bonds to draw sharp 
conclusions.  Consequently, we focus on those sovereigns in our sample that issue both local and 
foreign parameter-based bonds. 
 
5. Dual Issuers 
We identify those instances in our sample in which a sovereign issued bonds under both 
foreign and local parameters with roughly comparable maturities. The advantage of focusing on 
sovereigns that issue bonds under both foreign and local parameters (dual issuers) is that it avoids 
the problem that plagues all cross-sectional analyses – the implicit assumption that “all else is 
equal.”  But all else is never equal.  It is up to the researcher to identify and control for the 
innumerable differences that exist between observations. By focusing on each sovereign 
separately, we are holding almost everything else equal,10 because the pair of bonds was issued by 
the same sovereign. 
We report the results for all situations in which the sovereign issued a bond with all local 
parameters and a bond issued by that same country that has at least one of the three key parameters 
– Law, Listing and Currency – as foreign.  We also require that either the maturities of the two 
bonds be within a one-year period or the maturity on the bond with the higher yield being lower 
than that of the bond with the lower yield (so that, under the assumption of an upward sloping 
yield curve, the initial direction of the yield comparison would hold even if the maturity of the first 
bond were increased). 
Overall, the majority of the bonds in the subsample (more than 75%) have maturities of 
five years or more. Recall that sovereigns that issue exclusively either local or only foreign-
parameter bonds are not in this sample. 
In Tables 6 and 7 we separate our dual issuers subsample into investment and non-
investment grade sovereigns and compare the yields on these two subsets.  To illustrate, the first 
entry in Table 6 is for Argentina.  The data show that over our sample period, there were three 
                                                
10 The size of the offerings are typically not the same.  Universally the local issues are significantly larger in size than 
foreign issues.  See Table 6 subsequently. 
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instances in which Argentina issued both foreign and local bonds within our timing convention.  
The data show that in one of these instances, the yield on the local bond is greater than the yield 
on the foreign bond; and in the other two, the yields on the two bonds are the same. 
Table 6 reports our results for non-investment grade sovereigns.  The total number of dual 
issuances is 165 (132+23+10) and in 132 of these instances (80%), the yield on the foreign bond 
is less than the yield on the local bond.  Apparently relinquishing control of their debt to foreign 
investors and institutions results in a lower cost of capital for the issuing sovereign.11  We find an 
almost opposite result in the subsample of investment grade sovereigns reported in Table 7.   
            We identify 102 instances of dual issuances by investment grade sovereigns. The data show 
that in only 49% of the instances was the foreign yield lower than the yield on the local bond.  In 
other words, the market does not appear to reward high-quality sovereigns for issuing foreign 
bonds.  Presumably these sovereigns are sufficiently trustworthy that relinquishing control to 
foreign investors has little effect on the yield at issuance.   
In order to quantify the above results we calculate the mean spreads for the local and 
foreign bonds for the non-investment grade and investment grade bonds.  The results are reported 
in Table 9.  The data show that for the below-investment grade bonds, the mean spread is 
significantly lower for foreign bonds relative to domestic bonds.  This suggests that the market 
rewards low-quality sovereigns for issuing foreign parameter bonds.  In other words, if low-quality 
sovereigns are willing to relinquish control of their debt to investors, they enjoy a lower cost of 
capital: 4.64% for local issues but only 2.58% for foreign issues.  The t-Statistic for the difference 
is 6.44.  This raises the question as to why low-quality sovereigns ever issue local debt.  There are 
a couple of possible answers here.  First, it is established wisdom in the development sphere that 
it is important for emerging market sovereigns to develop local bond markets so as to protect 
themselves in times of crisis (the “original sin” problem) (Eichengreen & Haussman 1999; Inter-
American Development Bank 2006).  Relatedly, it also may be that countries that build strong 
domestic institutions have to go through some period of time where investors are skeptical about 
the institutions (and charge higher rates), before investors believe that these institutions really will 
protect against the risk of expropriation.  Therefore, sovereigns may be willing to forgo a lower 
                                                
11 As an aside, it is worth noting that the issuers closest to the margin (strong sovereigns like Poland and Mexico that 
are close to moving up to investment grade) are the ones who have the most ambiguous data. 
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rate, ex ante, in the interest of obtaining benefits in the future. Second, weaker sovereigns may not 
always be able to tap the foreign markets, whereas domestic institutions may be more amenable to 
suasion by the sovereign.   
The difference in the spreads for local and foreign bonds is significantly smaller for the 
high-quality sovereigns (0.61% versus 2.07%), although the difference is statistically significant 
(t-Statistic is 2.95).  This result implies that even the high-quality sovereigns face a lower rate if 
they issue foreign bonds.  However, as the data in Table 4-B show, they issue foreign debt less 
than 50% of the time.  One explanation for this result is that high-quality sovereigns only issue 
foreign bonds when they can do so at an attractive rate, perhaps because of the specific parameters 
demanded by investors. Another possibility is that the high-quality sovereigns are sometimes 
induced (required) to issue local-parameter debt by local regulators.  It may be the case, for 
example, that local financial institutions can only fulfill domestic capital requirements if they hold 
a certain amount of local-parameter government bonds.  Finally, we note that the spread difference 
in the non-investment sample is greater than difference in the investment grade sample (1.46% 
with a t-Statistic of 3.83). 
In order to examine further the different effects of local versus foreign parameters, we 
perform our regression model on this subset of the data.  Table 10 reports the results of this 
analysis. Unlike the results based on the entire sample, ratings are only significant in models (3) 
through (5).  In these three models, all of the ratings coefficients are significant and almost 
monotonic. More important, the coefficients on all of the foreign parameters are negative and 
highly significant.  Moreover, two of the three foreign parameters (Law and Currency) are 
statistically significant when included in the regression model – see Column (5).  The one foreign 
parameter that is not significant is the one that one would expect to be the least important of the 
three – Listing.  As discussed earlier, Listing is the parameter that gives the sovereign the least 
amount of leeway in terms of being able to expropriate value from the creditors. 
In Table 11 we expand the regression model reported in Table 10 by entertaining the six 
independent variables used by the World Bank to assess the governance quality of sovereigns. The 
first thing to note in Table 11 is that adding these governance variables reduces the significance of 
a number of the ratings coefficients.  This implies that the World Bank variables contain 
information that is also reflected in the S&P ratings. Note however the coefficients are almost all 
monotonic. The holdout rating is BBB, and the coefficients on all higher rated bonds are all 
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positive and all those on all lower rated bonds are negative. The data show that Government 
Effectiveness reduces the interest rates sovereigns have to pay to issue their debt.  Curiously, the 
Rule of Law is positively related to yield spreads. We are at a loss to explain this result. 
The coefficients on all the foreign issue parameters (Law, Listing and Currency) are 
negative and significant. In addition, two of the three are statistically significant when they are all 
included in the same regression – see column 5. 
As before we rerun our regression models with real spreads as the dependent variable. The 
results are reported in Table 12.  The data show that the coefficients on our variables of interest 
(Law, Listing, and Currency) are all negative and significant when estimated separately and 
governing law is significant and negative when all three are entered into the model. Moreover, the 
results suggest that our results (conclusions) are not driven by differential expected rates of 
inflation. 
The results reported above suggest that for low-quality sovereigns, borrowing locally is 
consistently more expensive. However, we conjecture that low-quality sovereigns can only realize 
lower interest rates if they relinquish control of their issues and, in most instances, they are willing 
to incur the higher rate because the costs of relinquishing control are even higher.  For the high-
quality sovereigns, however, it is not so clear. Indeed, there it is often the case that borrowing 
foreign is just as expensive, or more expensive, than borrowing locally. And, if so, the question is 
why these countries ever issue foreign parameter bonds.  One possible answer is provided by a 
recent study that reports on interviews with government debt managers (Gelpern & Gulati 2016).  
The debt managers in the study answer a question roughly similar to the one posed above by 
explaining that all but the highest quality countries (like the US and Germany) are concerned about 
the possibility of bad times and their internal debt markets drying up (as they did, for example, in 
2008 in wake of the Lehman crisis). They, therefore, continue to issue at least small amounts of 
debt under foreign parameters so that those investors who demand those parameters for their bonds 
(inevitably foreign investors) continue to provide capital and, in particular, can be tapped during a 
crisis.  
Before concluding, we address some possible concerns regarding our results. First, if past 
realized inflation is significantly different from expected inflation then our results would be 
suspect.  Second, there could be a correlation between the decision to borrow in local currency and 
the decision to govern the bond under local or foreign law that could be contaminating the results 
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of the legal regime variable. For instance, conditional on issuing in Euros, a sovereign would more 
than likely adopt a foreign governing law than if it issued debt in USD.  However, we find that the 
correlation between foreign law and foreign currency in our sample is sufficiently low (0.51); thus, 
the decision to borrow in local currency and the decision to govern the bond under local or foreign 
law are not strongly related; in other words, there is little evidence of multicollinearity between 
these two variables that could be contaminating our results. Third, there is the possibility that the 
yields (particularly local yields) for some countries are unduly low because of financial repression. 
That is, the government both forcing its local financial institutions to buy its bonds and mandating 
particular (low) yields, as opposed to allowing market forces to set them.  There are a couple of 
responses to this concern.  First, the data we use for our dual issuance analysis is almost all from 
a period of time where repression was relatively minimal.   Specifically, Reinhart & Sbrancia 
(2015) identify the period of most intense financial repression as being prior to 1980.  Roughly 
95% of the bonds in the dual issuance subsample were issued after January 1, 1990 (and the 
remainder are from the period between 1980 and 1990).  Second, given the direction in which 
repression typically works (local yields are pushed down artificially to subsidize government 
borrowing) our results would likely be even stronger if the true local rates were utilized.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The Greek sovereign debt restructuring of 2012 illustrates how investors who hold bonds 
governed by foreign parameters are better protected from expropriation during times of crisis than 
investors who hold bonds under local parameters.  And this should be the case for both  rich 
western industrialized nations as well as poorer eastern developing nations.  Comparing across 
countries then, we should see that bonds under local parameters carry higher spreads than those 
under foreign parameters. 
The data tell us, however, that there is a dichotomy in the market. The richest sovereign 
issuers issue debt almost exclusively under local parameters and the weakest sovereigns issue debt 
primarily under foreign parameters. Controlling for the financial strength of the issuers, we find 
that foreign parameters correlate with lower spreads.  That then begs the question of why the rich 
issuers are not issuing under foreign parameters; after all, the foreign parameter bonds should still 
carry less risk than the local ones. One answer comes from the literatures on credible commitments 
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pioneered by North and Weingast (1989) and on the separation of ownership and control pioneered 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983).  
  The story is that bond investors, under conditions where the sovereign issuer can credibly 
commit not to expropriate value from them, may prefer to lend to a country that issues exclusively 
(or nearly so) under local parameters. The reason is that investors, assuming they can constrain 
expropriation and can be assured that the government officials at hand tend to make high quality 
decisions, may prefer to leave discretion in the hands of government officials (that is, issuing bonds 
under local parameters).  In particular, knowledgeable government officials with the discretion 
afforded to them by a debt stock largely governed by local parameters, are going to be in a better 
position to tackle financial crises than inexpert and dispersed bondholders.12   
We are optimistic that the foregoing analysis has added to the existing literature on the 
choice of whether to stay local or go foreign in the issuance of sovereign bonds.  Future research 
might benefit from parsing the local versus foreign parameter distinction more finely, particularly 
if the laws vary considerably.   All local laws, after all, are not the same. German local law, for 
example, might be far less likely to allow government expropriation of value from bondholders 
than, for example, Greek local law (Carletti et al., 2016).   The same argument can be made for 
foreign laws.  New York law and English law, the two most popular foreign laws, are different in 
some key respects in terms of how they instruct judges to interpret contracts (e.g., Burn 2014).  
We take some steps in this direction by utilizing the World Bank’s measures of rule of law quality. 
But, as scholars have observed, the current measures are at best rough estimates and more could 
be done (e.g., Ginsburg 2011). 
  
                                                
12 Gelpern and Gulati (2016) interviewed government debt managers around the globe about a similar question. The 
managers in the richer countries explained their local v. foreign debt issuance patterns in terms of signaling.  In 
particular, managers want investors to perceive that there is no risk of restructuring.  That, to them, translates into 
taking the position that there is no benefit to issuing bonds that have greater protections in the event of a restructuring.  
Therefore, they don’t issue these bonds unless there is some specific reason to do so, in the form of either an 
idiosyncratic need on the part of some long-term investor or to maintain a small presence on an outside market or if 
they perceive there to be a temporary yield mismatch that they can take advantage of. Indeed, Gelpern and Gulati 
report that debt managers from rich nations regularly (and sometimes aggressively) state that they often–particularly 
in the case of demand-driven issuances--suffer a yield penalty for issuing debt under foreign parameters. 
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Table 1 
Total Sample 
 
OBS 
                                      
Country 
               
Total 
All 
Foreign 
All        
Local 
% All 
Foreign 
% All 
Local 
                              
Average Ratings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 Botswana 6 0 5 0.0% 83.3% 13.71 A+ 
2 Chuvash 6 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 15.00 AA- 
3 Dubai 4 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 12.00 A- 
4 Kabardino-Balkaria 1 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
5 Kalmykia 1 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
6 Karelia 14 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
7 Khakassia 8 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
8 Komi 6 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
9 Luxembourg 2 0 2 0.0% 100.0% 10.00 BBB 
10 Malta 7 0 7 0.0% 100.0% 15.00 AA- 
11 Mordovia 1 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
12 Netherlands 256 0 254 0.0% 99.2% 17.94 AAA 
13 Sakha (Yakutia) 14 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
14 Singapore 70 0 70 0.0% 100.0% 18.00 AAA 
15 Udmurtia 6 0 0 0.0% 0.0% . . 
16 United Kingdom 711 0 694 0.0% 97.6% 17.89 AAA 
17 United States of America 807 0 807 0.0% 100.0% 18.00 AAA 
18 France 1179 1 1175 0.1% 99.7% 18.00 AAA 
19 Germany 434 1 430 0.2% 99.1% 18.00 AAA 
20 Spain 832 14 592 1.7% 71.2% 15.90 AA 
21 Czech Republic 360 10 326 2.8% 90.6% 14.52 AA- 
22 Australia 640 20 588 3.1% 91.9% 18.00 AAA 
23 Japan 930 31 0 3.3% 0.0% 15.33 AA- 
24 Nigeria 90 3 86 3.3% 95.6% 5.92 BB- 
25 Bulgaria 308 11 265 3.6% 86.0% 9.01 BBB- 
26 Austria 525 20 255 3.8% 48.6% 17.91 AAA 
27 Hungary 960 44 905 4.6% 94.3% 8.25 BB+ 
28 Panama 42 2 0 4.8% 0.0% 7.53 BB+ 
29 Belgium 638 32 505 5.0% 79.2% 16.84 AA+ 
30 Slovenia 129 7 85 5.4% 65.9% 14.94 AA- 
31 Poland 511 28 421 5.5% 82.4% 12.54 A 
32 Sweden 908 52 577 5.7% 63.5% 17.79 AAA 
33 Russia 633 37 0 5.8% 0.0% 9.52 BBB 
34 Italy 1174 71 183 6.0% 15.6% 14.33 A+ 
35 Romania 279 18 0 6.5% 0.0% 7.90 BB+ 
36 Latvia 116 8 0 6.9% 0.0% 9.68 BBB 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
OBS 
                                      
Country 
        
Total 
All 
Foreign 
All        
Local 
% All 
Foreign 
% All 
Local 
                              
Average Ratings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
37 Denmark 396 28 153 7.1% 38.6% 17.36 AA+ 
38 China 378 29 348 7.7% 92.1% 13.61 A+ 
39 Canada 57 6 6 10.5% 10.5% 17.58 AAA 
40 Lithuania 353 38 0 10.8% 0.0% 10.32 BBB 
41 Ukraine 280 34 7 12.1% 2.5% 4.06 B 
42 Kazakhstan 81 10 0 12.3% 0.0% 9.26 BBB- 
43 Norway 194 27 147 13.9% 75.8% 18.00 AAA 
44 Vietnam 10 2 7 20.0% 70.0% 7.25 BB 
45 Iceland 253 58 0 22.9% 0.0% 11.59 A- 
46 Belarus 26 6 19 23.1% 73.1% 5.13 B+ 
47 Turkey 282 75 113 26.6% 40.1% 7.28 BB 
48 Indonesia 83 23 60 27.7% 72.3% 7.75 BB+ 
49 Cyprus 12 4 0 33.3% 0.0% 11.00 BBB+ 
50 El Salvador 12 4 0 33.3% 0.0% 7.76 BB+ 
51 Thailand 92 33 0 35.9% 0.0% 10.09 BBB 
52 Philippines 91 37 7 40.7% 7.7% 8.01 BB+ 
53 Malaysia 103 42 7 40.8% 6.8% 11.68 A- 
54 Slovakia 11 5 1 45.5% 9.1% 12.15 A- 
55 Ireland 236 113 101 47.9% 42.8% 15.29 AA- 
56 Greece 68 33 9 48.5% 13.2% 11.29 BBB+ 
57 Seychelles 6 3 0 50.0% 0.0% 4.00 B 
58 Mexico 167 87 5 52.1% 3.0% 8.49 BB+ 
59 Croatia 76 40 16 52.6% 21.1% 9.05 BBB- 
60 Finland 398 213 173 53.5% 43.5% 16.87 AA+ 
61 Lebanon 94 60 0 63.8% 0.0% 3.97 B 
62 Portugal 63 42 9 66.7% 14.3% 13.85 A+ 
63 Argentina 178 123 3 69.1% 1.7% 6.14 BB- 
64 Colombia 67 59 0 88.1% 0.0% 7.98 BB+ 
65 Brazil 121 112 0 92.6% 0.0% 6.73 BB 
66 Chile 15 14 0 93.3% 0.0% 12.81 A 
67 Uruguay 63 59 0 93.7% 0.0% 6.65 BB 
68 Venezuela 77 73 0 94.8% 0.0% 6.01 BB- 
69 New Zealand 97 92 0 94.8% 0.0% 16.80 AA+ 
70 Jamaica 33 32 0 97.0% 0.0% 4.00 B 
71 Israel 35 34 0 97.1% 0.0% 12.31 A- 
72 Abu Dhabi 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 16.00 AA 
73 Albania 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.00 B+             
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OBS 
                                      
Country 
               
Total 
All 
Foreign 
All        
Local 
% All 
Foreign 
% All 
Local 
                              
Average Ratings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
74 Aruba 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 10.00 BBB 
75 Bahamas 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 11.50 A- 
76 Bahrain 9 9 0 100.0% 0.0% 11.25 BBB+ 
77 Barbados 7 7 0 100.0% 0.0% 11.40 BBB+ 
78 Belgian Congo 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
79 Belize 5 5 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.67 B+ 
80 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
81 Buryatia 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
82 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
83 Costa Rica 12 12 0 100.0% 0.0% 7.00 BB 
84 Cuba 3 3 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
85 Dominican Republic 5 5 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.29 B+ 
86 Ecuador 4 4 0 100.0% 0.0% 3.50 B 
87 Egypt 5 5 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.50 BB- 
88 Estonia 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 12.00 A- 
89 Fiji 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.50 B+ 
90 Gabon 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 6.00 BB- 
91 Georgia 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.00 B+ 
92 Ghana 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.50 B+ 
93 Grenada 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.50 B+ 
94 Guatemala 4 4 0 100.0% 0.0% 6.60 BB 
95 Honduras 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.00 B 
96 Iran 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.00 B+ 
97 Ivory Coast 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
98 Jordan 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 7.00 BB 
99 Korea 11 11 0 100.0% 0.0% 12.00 A- 
100 Macedonia, FYR 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 7.50 BB+ 
101 Mariy El 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
102 Mauritius 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% . . 
103 Moldova 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 3.50 B 
104 Mongolia 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.50 BB- 
105 Montenegro 3 3 0 100.0% 0.0% 6.33 BB- 
106 Morocco 5 5 0 100.0% 0.0% 8.44 BB+ 
107 Oman 1 1 0 100.0% 0.0% 9.00 BBB- 
108 Pakistan 7 7 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.44 B 
109 Paraguay 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 7.00 BB 
110 Peru 27 27 0 100.0% 0.0% 8.06 BB+ 
111 Qatar 7 7 0 100.0% 0.0% 14.14 A+ 
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OBS 
                                      
Country 
        
Total 
All 
Foreign 
All        
Local 
% All 
Foreign 
% All 
Local 
                              
Average Ratings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
112 Senegal 4 4 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.00 B+ 
113 Serbia 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 5.83 BB- 
114 South Africa 49 49 0 100.0% 0.0% 9.12 BBB- 
115 Sri Lanka 2 2 0 100.0% 0.0% 4.83 B+ 
116 Trinidad and Tobago 8 8 0 100.0% 0.0% 10.29 BBB 
117 Tunisia 9 9 0 100.0% 0.0% 9.80 BBB 
         
 Total 17,349 2,293 9,423 13.2% 54.3%   
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Table 2  
                  Relation between Ratings and % of All Foreign Bonds 
      
		 		 		 																						Mean	 		 		
Group	 %	All	Foreign	 N	 Rating	 Score	 Std	
	      
1	 5%	or	Less	 21	 A+	 14.42	 4.02	
	      
2	 More	than	5%	and	less	than	95%	 40	 BBB+	 10.56	 4.14	
	      
3	 95%	or	less	 40	 BB	 7.43	 3.22	
	      
      
      
 Comparison	 Difference	
t-
Statistic	 	
      
 Group	1	-	Group	2	 3.86	 	 3.53	 	
      
 Group	2	-	Group	3	 3.13	 	 3.77	 	
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Table 3 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate 
on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity.  Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses and 
minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Maturity is stated in years.  The model includes 
separate year and sovereign fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the sovereign 
level. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AAA -1.397*** -1.804*** -1.518*** -1.499*** -1.730*** 
AA -1.237*** -1.322*** -1.122*** -1.216*** -1.320*** 
A        -0.740** -0.812*** -0.699** -0.759** -0.809** 
BB          1.152*         1.159* 1.462** 1.463** 1.430** 
B           0.403         0.710          0.758          0.633          0.685 
 
Maturity      -0.053*** -0.053***   0.054*** 
        -
0.055***    -0.055*** 
      
Foreign Law -0.732**    -0.588* 
      
Foreign Currency  -0.963**   -0.543 
      
Foreign Listing   -0.344  0.174 
      
All Foreign    0.779**  
      
Constant 2.333*** 2.787*** 5.509*** 5.042 5.288 
      
Observations 15,583 16,162 15,154 14,632 14,632 
      
R2 0.655 0.649 0.657 0.670 0.670 
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,  * p  < 0.10     
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Table 4 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate 
on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity.  Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses and 
minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Maturity is stated in years.  The model includes 
separate year and sovereign fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level.  
    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AAA     -1.175** -1.600*** -1.273*** -1.267*** -1.541*** 
AA -1.297*** -1.392*** -1.146*** -1.246*** -1.373*** 
A      -0.669* -0.744** -0.594* -0.669* -0.739** 
BB        0.948 0.970 1.150* 1.159* 1.116 
B        0.277 0.568 0.441 0.377 0.436 
      
Maturity -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.055*** 
      
Voice and accountability 0.285 -0.003 -0.117 0.04 -0.003 
      
Political stability -0.416 -0.34 -0.508 -0.492 -0.487 
      
Government 
Effectiveness -1.071** -1.147** -0.826* -0.953** -0.961** 
      
Regulatory quality -0.763 -0.638 -0.477 -0.49 -0.453 
      
Rule of Law 0.969 0.889 0.518 0.678 0.686 
      
Corruption 0.642 0.671 0.698 0.832 0.853 
      
Foreign Law -0.760**    -0.485 
      
Foreign Currency  -1.028**   -0.636 
      
Foreign Listing   -0.383  0.148 
      
All Foreign    -0.771**  
      
Constant 7.841*** 3.052*** 2.364*** 2.967*** 3.234*** 
      
Observations 14,266 14,704 13,859 13,470 13,470 
      
R2 0.685 0.68 0.687 0.697 0.698 
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,  * p  < 0.10     
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Table 5 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the real spread between the real interest rate of the bond and 
the real rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity.  Ratings are taken from S&P with 
the pluses and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Maturity is stated in years.  The 
model includes separate year and sovereign fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the country level.  
    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AAA -4.662** -5.828*** -5.047** -4.697** -5.237** 
AA -1.826** -2.148** -1.982** -2.056** -2.293** 
A -1.523* -1.828** -1.811* -1.785* -1.890* 
BB -6.712** -6.036* -6.596 -7.468* -7.549* 
B -13.98** -13.34** -15.20** -15.55** -15.43** 
      
Maturity -0.030** -0.030** -0.031** -0.032** -0.033** 
      
Voice and accountability 3.696 3.402 2.783 3.327 3.316 
      
Political stability 1.874 2.071 1.719 1.689 1.703 
      
Government effective 5.975** 6.100** 5.972** 5.667* 5.737* 
      
Regulatory quality -4.097 -3.709 -3.947 -4.028 -3.973 
      
Rule of Law -3.357 -3.496 -3.329 -3.298 -3.401 
      
Corruption 3.874** 4.496** 4.446** 4.052** 4.038** 
      
Foreign Law -1.799**    -1.455 
      
Foreign Currency  -1.887*   -1.402 
      
Foreign Listing   -0.814  0.499 
      
All Foreign    -2.158**  
      
Constant -9.001 -7.810 -9.930 19.56** 19.61** 
      
Observations 14,252 14,688 13,843 13,456 13,456 
      
R2 0.467 0.479 0.471 0.462 0.463 
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,  * p  < 0.10     
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Table 6 
Non-Investment Grade Bonds 
 
        
Sovereign Foreign	<	Local Foreign	>	Local Foreign	=	Local Rating %Foreign	<	Local
Argentina 1 0 2 BB- 33.33%
Brazil 0 0 2 BB 0.00%
Bulgaria 1 0 1 BBB 50.00%
Colombia 1 0 1 BB 50.00%
Croatia 12 2 0 BBB 85.71%
Greece 0 3 0 BBB- 0.00%
Hungary 26 0 0 BB+ 100.00%
Iceland 6 0 0 BBB- 100.00%
Indonesia 2 0 1 BB- 66.67%
Latvia 5 1 0 BB+ 83.33%
Lithuania 8 0 1 BBB 88.89%
Mexico 13 8 1 BBB 59.09%
Nigeria 3 0 0 BB- 100.00%
Peru 1 0 0 BB+ 100.00%
Philippines 15 0 0 BB 100.00%
Poland 13 6 0 BBB+ 68.42%
Romania 15 0 0 BB+ 100.00%
Russia 3 0 0 BBB 100.00%
Seychelles 2 0 0 B 100.00%
Turkey 1 3 1 BB+ 20.00%
Ukraine 14 0 0 B+ 100.00%
Vietnam 1 0 0 BB 100.00%
TOTAL 132 23 10 80.00%
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Table 7 
Investment Grade Bonds 
 
 
 
Sovereign Foreign	<	Local Foreign	>	Local Foreign	=	Local Rating %Foreign	<	Local
Czech	Republic 4 1 0 AA 80.00%
Australia 0 1 0 AAA 0.00%
Austria 2 6 0 AAA 25.00%
Belgium 17 4 1 AA+ 77.27%
Denmark 1 5 3 AAA 11.11%
Finland 6 5 2 AAA 46.15%
Germany 0 1 0 AAA 0.00%
Ireland 1 0 0 A 100.00%
Italy 3 9 1 AA 23.08%
Japan 0 2 0 AAA 0.00%
Norway 4 1 0 AAA 80.00%
Slovakia 0 1 0 A 0.00%
Slovenia 2 1 0 AA 66.67%
Spain 3 4 1 AA 37.50%
Sweden 8 2 1 AAA 72.73%
UK 0 0 1 AAA 0.00%
TOTAL 50 42 10 49.02%
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Table 8 
Mean Spreads 
                   Non-Investment Grade Bonds   
         
 Local Bonds   Foreign Bonds   Difference   
t-
Statistic  
         
 4.64%  2.58%  2.07%  6.44  
         
                                      Investment Grade Bonds   
         
 Local Bonds   Foreign Bonds   Difference   
t-
Statistic  
         
 1.02%  0.41%  0.61%  2.95  
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Table 9 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate 
on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity.  Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses and 
minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Maturity is stated in years.  The model includes 
separate year and sovereign fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the sovereign 
level.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AAA -0.248 -1.408 -1.303** -1.003* -1.297** 
AA -0.696 -1.035 -1.036* -1.045* -1.063** 
A -0.727 -1.182* -0.857*** -0.789** -1.996*** 
BB -0.246 0.297 1.464*** 1.390*** 1.430*** 
B 0.765 2.258 3.469*** 2.7590** 3.361*** 
 
Maturity -0.060*** -0.061** 0.087** -0.078** -0.074** 
      
Foreign Law -1.190***    -0.520* 
      
Foreign Currency  -1.807***   -1.484** 
      
Foreign Listing   -0.867***  0.482 
      
All Foreign    -1.158***  
      
Constant 0.405 1.696 0.406 7.149*** 7.244*** 
      
Observations 448 469 431 414 414 
      
R2 0.67 0.712 0.712 0.73 0.758 
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,  * p  < 0.10       
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Table 10 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate 
on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity.  Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses and 
minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Maturity is stated in years.  The model includes 
separate year and sovereign fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level.  
    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AAA -0.591 -1.639* -0.905 -0.958 -1.117* 
AA -1.193 -1.704* -1.102 -1.099* -1.125* 
A -0.233 -0.853 -0.318 -0.250 -0.541 
BB -0.245 0.311        1.582***        1.529***        1.513*** 
B -0.595 1.206        2.669*** 1.979      2.596** 
      
Maturity -0.050* -0.053** 0.075** -0.065** -0.063** 
      
Voice and accountability -2.390 -1.816 0.195 -0.009 -0.390 
      
Political stability -0.354 0.293 0.037 -0.313 -0.11 
      
Government effect -3.371** -3.167** -1.127 -1.267 -1.061 
      
Regulatory quality -1.657           -1.800 -2.191* -1.621 -1.697 
      
Rule of Law      5.656**    5.370** 2.719* 2.495 2.552 
      
Corruption -0.246 -0.030 -1.265 -1.606 -1.125 
      
Foreign Law       -1.131***    -0.525* 
      
Foreign Currency  -1.807***   -1.434** 
      
Foreign Listing   -0.674**  0.605 
      
All Foreign    -1.112***  
      
Constant -0.428 1.805 2.297 1.342 1.026 
      
Observations 409 427 389 375 375 
      
R2 0.681 0.124 0.718 0.737 0.762 
      
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,  * p  < 0.10     
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Table 11 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the spread between the real interest rate of the bond and the 
real rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity.  Ratings are taken from S&P with the 
pluses and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Maturity is stated in years.  The 
model includes separate year and sovereign fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. ***	p	<	0.01,			**	p	<	0.05,		*	p		<	0.10 
    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AAA -3.656 -4.356 -4.452 -3.050 -4.303 
AA -0.813 -0.997 -0.883 0.034 -0.797 
A -2.374 -2.658 -0.318 -1.965 -2.405 
BB -0.889 0.491    0.491   0.764 0.633 
B  0.372 1.220     2.826 3.542 3.468 
      
Maturity -0.0723 -0.0372 0.008 -0.051 -0.050 
      
Voice and accountability 35.28** 35.01** 37.70** 39.17** 38.07** 
      
Political stability -0.060 -0.099 0.073 -0.053 0.386 
      
Gov effectiveness 10.32 11.58 13.20* 12.60 12.22 
      
Regulatory quality -3.831           -3.817 -3.817 -3.536 -3.179 
      
Rule of Law -14.79    -15.24 -18.49 -18.28* -18.35* 
      
Corruption 12.78 12.78 12.78 11.55 12.03 
      
Foreign Law       -2.054***    -1.567** 
      
Foreign Currency  -1.848***   -2.60 
      
Foreign Listing   --1.937**  -1.027 
      
All Foreign    -1.339**  
      
Constant -65.19* -65.92* 52.39* -52.61 -50.63 
      
Observations 407 425 389 373 373 
      
R2 0.660 0.687 0.718 0.659 0.667 
 
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,  * p  < 0.10 
 
